Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1986

Solorio v. United States
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Solorio v. U.S. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 136. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives,
Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lexington, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~~-4~
~~~.~~t~~~

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
June 12, 1986, Conference
List 1, Sheet 2
Cert to Ct.Mil.App.
(Everett, ~

No. 85-1581-CMY (,
RICHARD SOLORIO (protests expansion of military court's
jurisdiction)

v.
UNITED STATES

1.

Timely

Federal/Civil

SUMMARY:

--

Petr contends that Ct.Mil.App. has expand-

ed the court-martial subject matter jurisdiction beyond the limits of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395
Commandant, 401

u.s.

u.s.

258

(1969), and Redford v.

355 (1971), and that retroactive application

of this new expansion violates his rights to due process.

C-t.Mil.~. hoA ~QW\W ~~

Ot\

··~ ~·
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FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Petr was living in Ju-

neau, Alaska, while serving in the Coast Guard.

After an unre-

lated transfer to Governors Island in New York, petr was charged
with

fourteen

specifications

in connection with acts with

minor children of Coast Guard parents while in Juneau.
dren were neighbors and

r

friends of petr' s children.

the Federal Office Building where he worked.

The acts

(There

base or enclave in Juneau for Coast Guard personnel.)

-----------~~-------

is~

Petr also

faced seven similar, but unrelated specifications for acts in New

~ York.
~~~
·~

The chil-

OCCUrred Within petrI S privately OWned horne in JuneaU 11 mileS

~om
~ ,
~~rv'

two

. ... .

After

dismissed
Commandant.

the

hearing

evidence

fourteen

Juneau

and

argument,

specifications

the
under

trial

Relford v.

Th ~ge -f~~ ~

"-- [Petr] was properly absent from his unit at the
time of each [offense in Juneau] .
"--Each offense • • • occurred away from any rnili tary
base at the accused's resident in the civilian community.
"--Each offense
military control.

occurred

in a place not

judge

under

"-- [T) here was no connection between the accused's
military duties and the alleged offenses.
"--The victims were not service members and were not
involved in military duties or military supported or
sponsored activities at the time of any of the alleged
offenses.
"--Civilian courts are present [in Alaska] and available to adjudicate the offenses.
While the State of
Alaska has presently deferred prosecution in light of
this proceeding, the State has not waived prosecution,
nor declined to prosecute.
"--Accused was not in uniform and in no way flouted
military authority at the time of the alleged offenses.
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"--None of the alleged offenses posed a threat to any
military installation . . . [or] resulted in any violation of military property.
"--All the alleged offenses are of the type traditionally prosecuted by civilian courts and are specifically of the type the Coast Guard has recently consented to have civilian courts prosecute Coast Guard members for in Alaska.
"
There has been no demonstrated impact of the
offenses on morale, discipline, the reputation or the
integrity of the Coast Guard in Juneau .••• The impact
apparent in this case, that is, on the parents and the
victims themselves is not different than that which
would be produced by a civilian perpetrator.
" ... There has been no showing of diminished morale,
discipline, or effectiveness within the military community in Juneau, Alaska.
As to the effect of the alleged incidents toward the Coast Guard within the civilian community, there has been speculation by military persr
but little more •.•. "
The Court of Military Review concluded that the trial
judge had erred

in basing his assessment of the impact on the

Juneau command solely on the observed effect after departure of
all parties, and that the relevant inquiry would be the impact of
the offenses on morale and discipline at Governors Island, where
the accused is now stationed and living on base.

The court also

disagreed with the trial court's finding that the parents were no
more affected than if the perpetrator had been a civilian: "Such
a conclusion overlooked the possible unique and distinct effect
from the discovery by the fathers that a fellow Coast Guardsman
may have committed volati ve offense" and the "natural expectation" that the Coast Guard "would take appropriate action to vindicate the outrage felt from such a grievous breach of faith by
one

shipmate

towards another."

"service connection"

and

The court held that there was

therefore jurisdiction as a matter of

No. 85-1581-CMY
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The dissent argued that a remand for further factual find(~,

effect at Governors Island) was necessary.

The Ct.Mil.App. found that the Ct.Mil.Rev. had probably
intruded upon the military judge's factf ind ing power, and that
precedents

involving offbase sex offenses against civilian de-

pendents of military personnel "would point to a different conelusion" than a finding of jurisdiction, Petition Sa, but nevertheless affirmed.
11

Relying on "later developments in the military community

"' and on "an increase in the concern
and in the society at large,"
of victims of crimes," Ct.Mil.App. decided to expand jurisdiction
to include the present offenses.

The court noted that the girls

were receiving counseling after the offense, and that the parents
also suffered psychological and f inane ial harm

("except to the

extent that, as military dependents, the victims were entitled to
medical car/ 't government expense").
ve'f .Mil.App.

noted that petr had been transferred from

Juneau before the discovery of the offenses, but opined that "if
this

[transfer]

had not occur red,

it obviously would have been

difficult--if not impossible--for the victim's fathers to continue to serve in the District Office with him."

Id., at lla.

The

court also speculated that future assignments for petr "would be
greatly limited" because of the animus felt towards sex offenders.

Finally, the court speculated that there might be lessened

interest of civilian authorities in prosecution due to the military transfers of the victims and the accused away from Alaska,
and benefits to petr, the victims, and the Coast Guard from try-

No. 85-1581-CMY
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ing the Juneau offenses together with similar offenses allegedly
committed at Governor's Island.
CONTENTIONS:

3.

~vy-Marine

Appellate defense divisions from the

the ~my,

Corps,

t~e~;ast

·--------

ana

Guard have

separate filings in support of granting the petition.

---

\;;;;

~ ,.-,._.~

-

........ ,.-.,

subm~ ttea
Because of

~

the substantial similarity of the basic claims, the various arguments are treated in this memo as "petr's" contentions.
Petr

first

argues

O'Callahan and Relford.

the

Ct.Mil.App.

has

departed

from

The Court in O'Callahan recognized that

military jurisdiction deprives citizens of the fundamental protections of the. Bill of Rights and Article III, ana must be limited "to the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."
395

U.S.,

(1955).

at

265,

quoting

Toth

v.

Quarles,

350

u.s.

11,

23

O'Callahan held that the service status of the offender

was necessary but not sufficient for court-martial jurisdiction.

u.s.,

395

at 267.

ll

There must also be a showing that the offense
.. ,

is service-connected.

.._,

~

factors applied in O'Callahan,
the base,

Petr contends that under the

Ia., at 272.

~

i.e., petr's proper absence from

the commission of the offense off base, the c i vi 1 ian

status of the victim,

the absence of military control over the

location of the offenses, ana the availability of civilian courts
to prosecute, ia., at 273, there is no military jurisdiction.
Petr alleges that the present case similarly fails under
the

traditional

O'Callahan's
(1971).

application

successor,

In Relford,

Relford

of
v.

the

factors

Commandant,

the Court. applied

the

outlined
401

u.s.

in
355

service-connection

test to a corporal who committed, on base, offenses against ci-
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page 6.

vilian females who were related to servicemen.
in finding

juri sd ict ion, Ct. Mi 1. App.

Petr argues that

ignored the detailed find-

ings of fact by the trial judge, who made specific inquiries into
the Relford factors.
Petr contends that beyond this rewriting of the record,
Ct.Mil.App. has erred more significantly by relying on the "continuing effect" of the offenses on the victims and the military
as its basis for jurisdiction.

Basing jurisdiction on the psy-

chological effect on the victim and the attendant impact on the
military, petr argues, would justify courts martial hearing cases
on many crimes,
dependent.

including any violent crime against a service

Moreover,

the

military

is

affected

whenever

a

servicemember commits an offense, if only because the military is
deprived of his services while he is prosecuted and serving sentence, and because it casts the military in a bad light when the
defendant is a serviceman.
jurisdiction

is

This expansive reach of court-martial

incompatible

with

the

Relford and O'Callahan, and the cases'

detailed

inquiries

of

reluctance to confer ju-

risdiction except to the least possible measure adequate to the
end to be served.
Petr also argues that Ct.Mil.App. has erred in suggesting

that

developments

O'Callahan and Relford
that law.

in

the

military

justify re-examining

and

society

since

the cases applying

Society's increased concern for the victims of crime

is no reason to deprive a serviceman of the constitutional protections of a civilian trial when jurisdiction is otherwise wanting.

Moreover, there is no indication that the civilian justice

No. 85-1581-CMY -
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system is any less interested in or any less capable of protecting the rights of victims than the military justice system.

Cer-

tainly here the Coast Guard has been completely satisfied with
the

treatment

Ct.Mil.App.

of

similar

cases

out,

Congress

pointed

by

Alaskan

and

state

courts.

As

the

legislatures have

made changes in civilian criminal systems to protect more fully
the rights of victims.

21 M.J. 251, 254-155.

Alaska has stated

only that it will defer prosecution.
Petr also contends that this case is not a rogue decision.

The Ct.Mil.App. has steadily increased the jurisdiction of

courts-martial.

Until 1980, the military courts found a lack of

jurisdiction in a significant number of military cases involving
off-post offenses including the use, sale, and transfer of drugs,
sex violations, and property crimes.
however, a divided Ct.Mil.App.,
M.J.

337,

350,

personnel with

held

that

See Army Brief 7.

In 1980,

in United States v. Trottier, 9

"almost every involvement of service

the commerce

in drugs

is

1

service connected.

1

"

Three years later, the court held it had jurisdiction over offpost larcenies committed with a stolen military ID card,
though the result was not consistent with its precedents.
States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. 1, 10.

even

United

Recently, the court held that

it had military jurisdiction in any offense committed by servicemen overseas.
1984), aff 1 d,

United States v.
21 M.J.

149

(C.M.A.

Holman,
1985).

19 M.J.

784

(A.C.M.R.

In the present case,

Ct.Mil.App. has gone beyond even these cases and found military
jurisdiction based on the "concern for victims of crimes."
M.J., at 254.

21

No. 85-1581-CMY
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Petr also argues that retroactive application of the new
jursidiction, even if the jurisdiction is warranted, denies him
Due Process.

As Ct.Mil.App. admitted, its precedents "point the

other way."

Petr therefore had, at the time of the offense, an

expectation that he was guaranteed indictment by grand jury and
trial by petit jury.
Resp SG first contends that the case is on interlocutory
appeal.

Although petr subsequently has been convicted and sen-

tenced,

the sentence has not been upheld by "the convening au-

thority."

The SG also contends that the trial on the merits has

produced additional facts that are relevant to the issue of jurisdiction.

The SG acknowledges that if Ct.Mil.App. declines to

hear this second appeal, the Court cannot grant certiorari (certiorari not available to courts of military review), but contends
that the Ct.Mil.App.

is "sensitive" to this fact, and that col-

lateral attack in federal habeas is still available.
On the merits, the SG uses a rationale mentioned by the
Court of Military

Review but

not

relied upon by Ct.Mil.App.:

there is no military base in Alaska for Coast Guard personnel and
their families.

A result contrary to Ct.Mil.App.'s would unrea-

sonably restrict the ability of the Juneau commander to protect
military personnel and their dependents.
the

"unusual circumstances"

It is "immaterial" in

of this case that the child abuse

occurred in petr's horne.
The SG also argues that Ct.Mil.App. was correct in relying on the effect on service families.

Enlisted personnel must

No. 85-1581-CMY -
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feel secure about the safety of their families in order to carry
out their missions while away from home.
Finally,

the

SG

notes

that

the

Alaska

child

abuse

charges did not stand alone, but petr was also charged with committing

similar

offenses

Governors Island.

against other military dependents at

The charges thus presented a pattern of behav-

ior that posed a real threat to families near petr.
4.
pears

DISCUSSION:

that

the

Ct.Mil.App.

On the

decision,

towards more

was not foreseeable.
legal drugs.

~e

although
expansive

of retroactivity,
part

of

a

court-martial

trend

it apwithin

jurisdiction,

The primary area of expansion involved il-

See Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74

United States v. Trottier,

9 M.J.

337

(C.M.A. 1983);

(C.M.A. 1980).

When the

offenses occurred, petr still was guaranteed indictment by grand
jury and trial by petit jury of peers.
Petr
O'Callahan

is

and

correct

Relford

in

by

based on a "new development"
crime."

arguing

finding

that

the

~
case

court-martial

erodes

jurisdiction

based on "concern for victims of

Ct.Mil.App. had found service connection based upon the

"continuing effect on the victims and their families 'which ultimately impacts' on the morale of any military unit."
lOa, 12a.

It is difficult to see how the limits of such an ap-

proach fit

w~

_____

the boundaries drawn by this Court.

~
..... convincing.
The SG's counter arguments are not

attempts

Petition

to characterize

this case as unique,

The SG

noting the fact

that there is no military base in Alaska, but the Ct.Mil.App.'s
opinion does

not

rely on any unusual facts.

It is true that

No. 85-1581-CMY
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Relford adopted "an ad hoc approach to cases where a trial by
court-martial is challenged."

u.s.,

401

at 365-366.

But despite
1-<d rlthe SG's attempts the opinion from Ct.Mil.App. simply doe ~ bear

out the characterization of this case as one that is squarely
bottomed on

unusual

facts.

As

the

language

in the preceding

paragraph shows, the Ct.Mil.App's opinion is not confined by any
In fact, Ct.Mil.App's con-

particularly abnormal circumstances.

cerns about "continuing effect" would justify court-martial jurisdiction after
viceman

upon

~

violent crime had been committed by a ser-

service

clearly beyond

dependents,

even

though

that

result

is

the contemplation of this Court in Relford and

O'Callahan.
Nor do I

find

---------

arguments convincing.
738

(1975)

the SG's "discipline and effectiveness"

-----..-.

See Schlesinger v.

Councilman,

420

u.s.

(court must gauge "the . impact of an offense on mili-

tary discipline and effectiveness,

... whether the military in-

terest in deterring the offense is distinct from and greater than
that of civilian society, and ... whether the distinct military
interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts").

Set-

ting aside Ct.Mil.App. 's strained counter-factual argument here
("had [Solorio's transfer prior to the discovery of the offenses]
not occurred, it obviously would have been difficult .•. for the
victims' fathers to continue to serve in the District Office with
him"),

the

court's

rationale

Relford and O'Callahan.
and

enlisted

personnel

here

again

reaches

far

beyond

It proves too much to say that officers
"must

feel

secure

about

the safety of

their families in order to carry out their responsibilities while

No. 85-1581-CMY

away from horne."

page 11.

This reasoning would extend court-martial ju-

risdiction to breaking and entering an off-base horne by another
serviceman.
Despite the arguments of the SG and the Ct.Mil.App, it
does not seem relevant that there were other,

similar charges

pending (where court martial jurisdiction was presumably proper).
Nothing in Relford or O'Callahan remotely suggests that the presence of jurisdiction over some charges confers jurisdiction over
"similar" charges arising from actions at a different time and
place.

The two cases seem to point the other way, with their

emphasis on assuring that, as far as possible, servicemen retain
their constitutional right to grand-jury indictment and trial by
petit jury.

Court-martial precedent also provides little or no

support for this "super pendent jurisdiction."
v.

Shockly,

18 C.M.A.

610

(1969) ·,

See United States

dismissing off-post charges

even though similar service-connected charges existed.
Finally, although the case is interlocutory, the jurisdictional issue is not subject to further challenge in the military courts, or to alteration by those courts.

If Ct.Mil.App.

declines to exercise discretionary review on petr's appeal from
his
case.

subsequent,

recent conviction,

this Court cannot hear

the

Therefore it appears that this is a case where "intermedi-

ate" review is proper because the question of jurisdiction has
been

finally

decided,

and

later

review of

the

jurisdictional

issue may be frustrated despite the ultimate outcome of the case.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

u.s.

469, 481 (1975).

I recommend granting the

etition

No. 85-1581-CMY ._:

on

the

jurisdictional

page 12.

question

and

on

the

accompanying

retroactivity question.
The SG has filed a response.
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Solorio v.

United States(U.S.

Court of Military

Appeals)
MEMO TO FILE:
This

case

presents

a

straightforward

question

jurisdiction as between military and civil ian court.

of
In

addition, a due process claim is argued rather weakly.
Petitioner was

a

petty

serving in Juneau, Alaska.
or "enclave",

off ice r

in the

Coast Guard

There was no military "base"

and Coast Guard personnel live and work in

the city and reside in the civilian community.

Petitioner

was charged with sexua ~ abusing the 10-year old daughter
of

his

next

door

enlisted man.

neighbor, - - Johnson,

a

Coast Guard

Petitioner also had a young daughter,

the two girls often played together.

and

The alleged offense

by petitioner occurred in his own residence over a period
of two years.
Following petitioner's transfer to Governors Island
in

New

York,

and

offenses there,
in

violation

This

case

of

after

he

was

charged

with

similar

petitioner was charged with sexual abuse
the

involves

Uniform
only

Code

Alaska

of

Military Justice.

charges.

Petitioner

2.

alleged

that

because

the

military

court

the offenses were not

lacked

"service connected"

this court's decisions in O' CAllahan v.
258 and Relford v. Commandant, 401
The

Trial

Advocate)
of

Judge

(I

jurisdiction

u.s.

assume

Parker,

395

under

u.s.

355.

the

Military

Judge

granted petitioner's motion to dismiss for want

jurisdiction.

He concluded that

the Alaska offenses

were not sufficiently "service connected" to be triable in
a military criminal justice system.
Guard

Court of Military Review

the Alaska charges.
facts

with

between
Service.

to

offenses

The

-

reversed,

and

reinstated

............

The Trial Judge had found a number of

respect

the

On appeal, the Coast

Court

accepted these facts,

the

and
of

absence

the

of

Coast

Military

any

Guard

connection
of

Appeals

Military

apparently

but concluded that the crimes were

sufficiently serviced connected to justify prosecution by
a

Court

young

Martial.

children

It

found

that

"sex

offenses
have

[in the military]

a

against

continuing

effect on the victims and their families and ultimately on

----..

the morale of any military unit or organization to which
the family member
number

of

decision.

factors

is assigned."
that

it

The court identified a

believed

relevant

to

its

3.

In O'Callahan v. Parker, decided in 1969, this court
announced /
martial

new law in this area by holding that a court

may

personnel
has

a

not

unless,

sufficient

exercise

jurisdiction

over

on the facts of the case,
impact

service connected.

on

military

service

the offense

interests

to

The opinion was written by Douglas,

and joined by Warren, Black, Brennan and Marshall.
wrote

a

strong

be

and

on

its

face

quite

Harlan

persuasive -

dissent, in which Stewart and White joined.

Justices Reed

and Clark had retired, and Justice Fortas had resigned.
In

Relford

reaffirmed
unrelated

v.

O' Callahan
inquiries:

(1971),

Commandant
and

narrowed

" ( 1)

the

the

impact

this

focus

of

Court

to

three

an offense on

military discipline and effectiveness, ••• (2) whether the
military

interest

in deterring

the

offense

is distinct

from and greater than that of civilian society,
(3)

whether

vindicated

the

distinct

adequately

Schlesinger v.

military

in

Councilman

courts.

civil
(1975),

interests

and

...

can

be

See

also

and more recently our

opinion in Goldman v. Weinberger that involved the wearing
by a Jewish serviceman of a yarmulke.

the

Although the SG finds,

contrary to the findings of

TC,

this

that

the

facts

in

case

show

an

adequate

4.

"service connection", the SG's primary argument - at least
as

I

read

the

brief

O'Callahan

and

number

times

of

doubtful

that

is

Relford.
since

a

that

we

O'Callahan
its

majority

has

decision,
here

should

overrule

been

cited

a

and

I

think

it

be

disposed

to

would

overrule it despite the arguments made by Harlan in his
quite

interesting

dissent

in which

he

reviewed

English

history.
It

is

true,

as

Harlan

emphasized,

that

the

Constitution vests open-end authority on Congress to make
rules for the "government and regulation" of our military
forces.

This

authority

conclude

that

the

prompts

jurisdiction

Harlan
conferred

to

argue
on

and

military

courts by Congress is not limited to "service connected"
offenses, and that this Court should leave it to Congress
to determine the jurisdiction of military courts.
If the issue were presented here for the first time,
I would find it a close one.
case -

Normally, where - as in this

the offense violates state criminal law as well as

the common law,

and is committed off-base,

I would think

the civilian courts are better qualified to try the case
and apply state law than a military court.
however,

In this case,

it is true that petitioner had left Alaska and

5.

that the New York courts probably would have had little
interest in sending him back to Alaska, particularly since
he had committed similar offenses in New York.

It also

certainly is true that where the offense is committed on
the

child

"friend"),

of

another

service member

in

this

the effect on morale may be adverse.

case

a

But if

the military had turned petitioner over to the civilian
courts promptly, there is no reason to doubt that he would
have been prosecuted under Alaska law.
In sum, I would like my clerk - in a brief cert memo
-

to indicate whether there is any basis for overruling

O' Callahan in light

of what

written.

I would like my clerk's view as to

Secondly,

the Court subsequently

has

· whether O' Callahan properly must be read as controlling.
If the answer to the first of these questions is "no", and
the answer to the second is "yes", the memo can be quite
brief.
LFP, JR.

.
adl 02/11/87 ~-
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To:
From:
Re:
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An~ ~ ~ ~~}'tsf@* 5 6z
No. 85-1581, Solorio v. United States ~ ~
1-D
~~~}.L:;:.

Oral Argument: Tuesday, February 24, 1987
Cert to the

u.s.

Ct. Military Appeals (Everett,

~ (~-:::=;.

C.J.) _ ~ ~

1

~a._;f)· .t-

QUESTION PRESENTED

~

~~

This case involves the juris dictional boundary between
civilian courts and military courts martial.
presented are:

(1)

'7

-

The questions

did the court below erroneously conclude

that petitioner's crimes were •service connected,• and thus
"'
'-- ·could be prosecuted in military couft;
(2) should the case
·~

~

~~

·

2.

that established the limitations on military jurisdiction,
0 1 callahan v. Parker, 395

u.s.

258 (1969), be overruled.

I. BACKG ROO ND
Petitioner Richard Solorio was a Coast Guard member
stationed in Juneau, Alaska.

There is no military base in

Juneau, so Solorio and the other 300 Coast Guard personnel
1 ived in private homes in the civil ian community.

Petr 1 s

children were friendly with the daughters of two other servicemen, and the girls often came to the Solorio house to
play.

It was during these visits that petr

sexu~lly

molest-

ed the girls, who at the time were between the ages of 10

--------·-The abuse took place over a two-year period.

and 12.

In June 1984 Solorio was reassigned to the Coast Guard
base at Governor 1 s Island, New York.

(The fathers of the

victims also were transferred, but not to New York.)

There

petr molested the daughters of two other servicemen.

Petr

finally

was

arrested,

and

during

the

investigation

crimes in Alaska came to light · for the first time.

the
The

Coast Guard commander in New York convened a court martial,
and petr was charged with 21 specifications including indecent assault and attempted rape.
related to the Juneau incidents,

Fourteen of these charges
the remaining seven in-

volved the New York crimes.
Solorio moved to dismiss the 14 counts alleging offenses in Alaska,

arguing that the military court had no

jurisdiction to consider these offenses.

'---------

At the hearing on

3.

this motion, the arguments focused on two cases, O'Callahan
v.

Parker,

supra, and Relford v.

Commandant, 401

u.s.

355

--

(1971).

In O'callahan, the Court held that not all crimes

committed by a serviceman could be tried by a court martial.
Instead, said the Oourt, the crime must somehow be "service
connected" before the accused could be denied the greater
protections afforded to civilian defendants.

~lford,

er in

Two years lat-

the Court attempted to define the concept of

"service connected" more precisely, identifying 12 critical
factors and 9 addi tiona! considerations that courts should
address in deciding whether military jurisdiction was proper.

See 401

u.s.,

at 365, 367-369 (a list of the factors

and considerations
'-._....-

Cl to this memo) •

The military trial judge granted Solorio's motion to
dismiss,
show

a

concluding that the evidence was insufficient to
connection

between

the

Coast Guard's

prosecution and the Alaska offenses.

interest in

The judge made a se-

ries of factual findings that were tied to the Relford factors.

were:

The

( i)

the crimes

took place away from a military base and while Solorio was
off-duty;

(ii) the Alaska civilian courts were available to

prosecute the offense;

(iii)

the crimes did not have any

impact on "morale, discipline, the reputation or the integrity of the Coast Guard in Juneau,
there,

the personnel assigned

[or] on military operations or missions"; (iv) there

was little evidence that the allegations concerning Solorio
were know to the civilian community in Juneau, or that the

4.

Coast Guard's relations with the community had suffered; (v)
although the crimes had affected the work performance of the
victims' fathers, the impact on the Coast Guard itself was
negligible.

See J.A. 195-200; Petn 62a-63a.

The Coast Guard Court of Military Review reversed and
---------:-.::::::::-~""C~·
·~- ·-------reinstated the charges, finding that the trial judget s analysis was flawed in several respects.

For example, the court

held that it was error to look only at the effect of the
offenses on the military and civilian community in Juneau.
It also was necessary to look at the impact of the charges
on the Coast Guard personnel in New York,
where petr currently was based.

since this was

The court also rejected the

trial judge's finding that the Alaska state court system was
~

available to try the case.

The court held that in compari-

son to the military, the civilian courts had a lower incentive to prosecute petr because both he and the victims had
moved from the state. See Petn 32a-34a.
~
The Military Review Court then reevaluated the evidence, and concluded that the crimes were
service connected.
,........____
The court examined the Relford considerations and found that
Solorio's crimes had interfered with the Coast Guard's commander' s

responsibility

to maintain order and

over those in his command.
(consideration

(b)).

See Relford, 401

discipline

u.s., at 367

The court also emphasized that the

victims were the dependents of servicemen, and that petr had
violated the trust that must exist between shipmates.

'·

s.

..
Solorio appealed,
peals

(USCMA)

but the

affirmed.

u.s.

Court of Military Ap-

The court acknowledged that "our

precedents involving offbase sex offenses against civilian
dependents of military personnel would point to a different
conclusion."

Petn Sa

(citations omitted).

It indicated,

however, that more recent cases concerning the service connection doctrine required a reexamination of that precedent
'--

-

-

--...._...____

~

"in light of more recent conditions and experience."

Id.,

at 9a.
The USCMA gave little indication what these recent condi tions were, except to note that society was becoming increasingly concerned with the rights of victims.

The court

then went on to find that these sex offenses had a continuing adverse affect on both the victims' families and on the
military unit to which they are assigned.
that the victims'

The USCMA noted

fathers had become less effective on the

job, and that the need for family counseling placed an emotional and financial
also

found

that

strain on the servicemen.

it would be more

efficient

The court
to

try

all

charges in New York before a court martial (where juris diction on the New York crimes was conceded), rather than try
some in New York and the rest in Alaska.
Solorio was court martialed in New York
1986.

in February

He was convicted on 8 of the 14 counts arising from

the Alaska incidents, and 4 of the 7 New York charges.

6.

II. DISCUSSION
Petr claims that the decision below has expanded courtmartial

jurisdiction

Court's precedent.

beyond

the

limits

allowed

by

this

The SG makes two argmnents in response.

First, he claims that the USCMA holding is in fact consistent with O'callahan and Relford.

Second, if this Court de-

termines that the crimes were not service connected, the SG
asks that O'callahan be overruled.

-

A. Is the Decision Below Consistent with Precedent?
Solorio persuasively argues that the lower courts have
misconstrued
O'callahan.

the

"service

connected"

He points out that the trial

requirement

of

judge examined

nearly all of the factors and considerations set forth in
\....._../ Relford,

and found as a matter of fact that none of these

criteria for military jurisdiction had been satisfied.

Petr

argues that the appeals courts largely ignored this analysis, choosing instead to adopt a more flexible approach that
largely eviscerates this Court's decisions.

He also asserts

that this case is part of a conscious trend in recent USCMA
cases to increase the military's jurisdiction.
The SG does not deny that the USCMA failed to follow
this Court's precedents precisely.

He nevertheless claims

that the decision below is correct, because the USCMA gave
great weight to several facts that demonstrate an overwhelming military interest in prosecuting the offense.

First,

the SG points out the victims were the dependent daughters
of Coast Guard p.e rsonnel.

The evidence showed that when the

7.

victims' fathers learned of the crimes their job performance
was adversely affected, and they became more suspicious of
their coworkers.

These problems made the fathers less use-

ful to the military, and thus Coast Guard had a direct interest in ensuring that Solorio was prosecuted.

An attack

on a serviceman's dependents also affects the rest of the
military unit.
victim's father

Crimes such as child abuse could cause the
to seek revenge against the perpetrator,

thus threatening the morale and discipline that is essential
in any military setting.

Consequently, the SG argues that

crimes

dependents

against

military

should

be

considered

service connected as a matter of law.
Second, the SG claims that there is a direct relationship between petr's crimes and the Coast Guard's commander's
interest

in

running

the

Alaska installation.

The

trial

judge found that the crimes had only an indirect impact on
the military, in part because the offenses occurred off base
in a private home.

But the commander is responsible for the

conduct and order of those under his control regardless of
their location.

Indeed,

it may be more necessary for the

commander to have authority over crimes when there is no
military base, since the Coast Guard's good reputation among
the civilians depends in part on its willingness to discipline its own members.

Thus,

it is argued, the mere fact

that a crime was committed off-base should not be decisive
in determining whether an event is service connected.

8.

There is merit to these claims, but neither is compel1 ing.

The Relford Court found it

"significant" that the

victims in that case were relatives of servicemen, but apparently did not include this point in the list of factors
and considerations that affect juris diction.
366-369
dency

(but cf. consideration (f)).

status of

the victims

seems

u.s.

See 401

Moreover, the depenrelevant to the Coast

Guard only to the extent that it affected the fathers' work
performance.

The trial court found that the effect on the

military was remote, and although the appellate courts disagreed with this conclusion,
disagreement is unclear.

the factual

basis for

their

Thus while there is a relationship

between a crime against a dependent and the military interest, nothing in the precedent or logic suggests that it is
entitled to the presumptive weight that the SG suggests.
The second argument also is not terribly persuasive.
Despite the SG's claim that the military commander has the
same interest in the · offense regardless of where it occurs

--------

both O'callahan and Relford hold that the situs of the crime
is critical.

Even though the commander is generally respon-

~

sible for the conduct of his men, this argument is too broad
because it would make every crime committed by a serviceman
subject to court martial.
in 0' Callahan.

Also,

This view was squarely rejected

there

is little

evidence

that

the

crimes in this particular case had an adverse impact on the
morale of
community.

other

servicemen in Juneau,

or on the civilian

The trial judge found that no one at the Coast

9.

Guard Station even learned of the charges until after petr
and the victims were transferred.
The SG's next claim is that the unusual procedural posture of this case makes it service related.

Here Solorio

also was charged with similar crimes in New York, and it is
undisputed that he was subject to a court martial there.

It

was more efficient to try all offenses in the same proceeding,

thus ensuring that justice was done quickly,

so that

the victims will be spared the ordeal of testifying twice.
This argument makes sense as a matter of policy, but I
am not sure that it makes the crimes service connected.

It

always will

is

be

more

efficient

to

try

a

soldier who

charged with both a military and a civilian offense in the
"-..._..-.

same court martial,

but nothing in the case law suggests

that administrative convenience is a sufficient basis for
military jurisdiction.

It also is not clear that that it

woUld have been more efficient to prosecute the charges together in this case.

The New York and Alaska crimes involve

separate victims and separate evidence, and thus each victim
would have to testify only once even if the charges were
prosecuted separately.

The victims and their families also

had to travel to testify no matter where the trial was held.
So even if the USCMA was correct in considering the efficiency advantage of a court martial, I question the conclusion that it weighed heavily in the government's favor here.
Finally, the SG argues that the Alaska civilian courts
had

a

diminished

interest

in

prosecuting

Solorio • . In

10.

Relford, the Court noted that one of the considerations supporting court-martial jurisdiction was the inability of civilian courts to vindicate a distinct military interests.
401

u.s.,

at 368.

The SG notes that in this case the Alaska

prosecutor deferred to the military, suggesting that it had
1 ittle interest in prosecuting a Coast Guardsman who had
been transferred.

The SG points out that if this Court were

to find that petr was entitled to a civilian trial, there is
no guarantee that petr would be retried in Alaska, or even
that the victims would return to that State to testify.
Since the Coast Guard plainly has an interest in seeing that
petr is prosecuted, it is argued, the State's reluctance to
do so favors affirming the decision below.
~

Again, there is merit to this argument, but not as much
as the SG suggests.

Alaska has not said it will not prose-

cute, it simply has stated that it will defer.
ing the New York trial,

Indeed, dur-

the parties stipulated as to the

expected testimony of an Alaska District Attorney, who would
have stated that "[s]hould the Coast Guard determine, however, that the court martial is without jurisdiction to prosecute this case,
to prosecute.•

[Alaska] would reconsider its decision not
J.A. at 67.

To summarize: the SG makes several arguments as to how
the Alaska offenses are service related within the meaning
of

o• Callahan.

The best argument is that the victims were

dependents of servicemen, and that t.he crime therefore af'

fected their father's military performance.

In other re-

11.

spects, however, the SG fails to show how the crimes had a
bearing on any military interest that would justify extending juris diction,

particularly

since there was no direct

impact on the Coast Guard itself.

Because the trial judge

found that none of the other Relford factors were present,
it seems that the USCMA erred in finding court martial jurisdiction.
B. Should O'callahan be Overruled?
The SG claims that O'Callahan marked an abrupt and unwarranted change from prior law.

Before that decision, the

test for jurisdiction appears to have been the status of the
defendant:

he

if

was

a

I

''
serv 1ceman,
~

•

- -- ·--------.....__.

martialed regardless of the offense.
~

opinion)

could

Mayden, 413

(O'callahan was a

be

court

See Kinsella v. United

u.s. 234, 240-241
u.s. 665, 672 (1973)

States ex rel. Singleton, 361
also Gosa v.

he

(1960); see

(plurality

"clear break with the past").

The SG asserts that this prior test was clearly supported by
the Constitution; Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 provides
that Congress has the power to "make regulations for the
~

Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces."
See also O'callahan, 395
ing).

u.s.,

at 275 (Harlan, J., dissent-

He now argues that the service-connected test should

be overruled and that court should again defer to Congressional judgment about which offenses are subject to a court

- -· ----------

martial.

The SG advances three arguments for his view: re-

cent developments have undermined the O'Callahan rationale;

12.

the service-connected test is unworkable; and O'Callahan is
inconsistent with the deference owed to Congress.
1. Recent Developments.

The Court's primary reason for

limiting military jurisdiction in O'Callahan was that court
martials do not adequately protect the rights of the accused.

The Court noted, for example, that the officer who

convened the Court martial had enormous influence over the
disposition of the case, because he was allowed to app9int
__/

the presiding officer,
defense counsel.

the members of the panel,

See 395

u.s.,

at 264.

and the

The presiding offi'

cer was not a neutral party, and often had direct command
over

the

court-martial

panel.

Moreover,

the

O'Callahan

Court was troubled by the great disparity between the civilian and military rules of procedure, evidence, and discovery.

See, e.g., id., at 264 n. 4 ("in a court martial, the

access of the defense to compulsory process [depends] on the
approval of the prosecution").

,

Finally, this Court conclud-

ed that court martials are "singularly inept in dealing with
the nice subtleties of constitutional law."

Id., at 265.

The SG asserts that ~ese conditions ~ lon~~
because over the last few years the military has altered its
procedures.

The convening off ice r has much less influence

th~embers
~rial is no

over the trial now than in the past, and

of the

tribunal are far more independent.

longer

conducted by a presiding officer, but by a military judge

r~~

~ L.VK~l,.J

selected by the Judge Advocate General.

The SG claims that .ht~
the military judge now has virtually the same degree of im- ~
·~~--d-vt--f
~\\

13.

G
fense

counsel

is

now

chosen according

-set

In addition, de-

partiality as his civilian counterparts.

to procedures

forth by regulation, and in some cases is removed from the

--=----=---> .

convening officer's chain of command.

Finally,

the Manual

for Courts Martial expressly prohibits any attempt to influence or intimidate the members of the court.
The SG also claims that th

-------------

covery have changed.

ules of procedu~~ dis-

The military judge now has sole re-

sponsibility for controlling the scope of discovery, not the
prosecutor.

The Military Rules of Procedure also have been

revised to bring them more in line with the federal civilian
rules.

In addition,

efendant now is entitled to a pre-

trial investigation that allows him to preview the govern\....___.-

ment • s case and cross-exam1ne witnesses before trial.
nally,

the

greater

SG asserts that

Fi-

the military judges now have

experience in resolving

constitutional

questions,

making the difference in protections afforded by the mil itary

and civilian courts negligible.

Councilman,

420

u.s.

738,

758

(1975)

See Schlesinger v.
(LFP for the Court)

(assuming that military court system will vindicate service- }
man's constitutional rights).
These

----

are appealing

arguments,

because

they

suggest

that there would be little substantive harm in abandoning
the O'Callahan test.

But even if the details have changed,

-------

the underlying rationale for that decision

ns: a ser-

viceman still is denied significant rights in a court mar-

-

tial that he would be granted in a civilian trial.

Most

~ ~

14.

significantly, a serviceman has no right to a grand jury

--

--------

indictment or a trial by jury.

The denial of the latter

right is especially troubling,

because the court martial

panel that decides defendant's guilt is not analogous to a
jury.

The convening officer still has great discretion in

choosing the members, who invariably are of a higher rank
than the accused.

More importantly, there is no requirement

that the panel reach a unanimous verdict; a 2/3 vote is all
that is needed, even for non-capital murder.
cus Curiae of

See Brief Ami-

u.s. Army, Defense App. Div., at 16-17 and

n.29.

This is not to suggest that these differences make all
military trials fundamentally unfair.

As the SG points out,

if a serviceman was tried for a misdemeanor in a State civilian court, he still would not necessarily be tried before
a jury.

But the basic differences between the military and

civilian courts that were recognized by O'Callahan still
strike me as significant.

So while I might conclude as an

original matter that the service-connected test is not constitutionally compelled,

I also cannot conclude that the

rationale of O'Callahan has been so fully
now should be overruled.
2. An "unworkable" rule.

Even though the 0' Callahan

rationale is basically sound, the Court still would be justified in overruling that decision if experience had shown
that the service-connected standard was unworkable or unduly
burdensome on military courts • . The SG claims that in fact

15.

the test has led to great confusion and inconsistent results.

For example, the SG cites a military case decided

shortly after O'Gallahan was announced, involving a serviceman's use of drugs.

At that time the military court decided

that the crime was sufficiently service-related to sustain
court-martial jurisdiction; several years later in another
case, however, the same court held that the off-base use of
drugs did not meet the 0' Callahan test.

The court subse-

quently reversed its position again, so that now virtually
all drug offenses are subject to court martial.
42

(citing cases).

Moreover,

SG Brief at

the SG claims that disputes

over jurisdiction constune a disproportionate amount of resources.
~

During one 2-year period, for example, roughly 12%

of the cases prosecuted by the Air Force involved jurisdiction questions.
I have no doubt that the O'Callahan test is difficult
to apply at times.

But I do not agree that the SG has shown

that the service-connected requirement is •unworkable."

The

example involving drug offenses is unpersuasive -- all that
the SG has shown is that "drug cases" do not always receive
identical

treatment.

But 0' Callahan clearly contemplates

that the existence of jurisdiction will turn on the facts of
----------~~------~,--------~~----~

each case, so it should not be surprising that not all drug
~

cases are tried in the same forum.

It would be more indica-

tive of confusion if the SG could show that two cases with
similar facts were tried in different forums.

Moreover, the

SG has not cited any scholarly literature or USCMA cases

'··

16.

that have demonstrated how the test is flawed.

In short,

without more evidence of chaos in the lower military courts,
I am not convinced that O' Callahan has been so burdensome
that it should be overruled.
'

3. Deference to the Military.

The SG's final claim is

that Congress and the military are in a much better position
-----.....___
_________,
to decide which crimes should be subject to a court martial,

------

and thus this Court should remove the limitations on this
authority imposed by O'callahan.

They cite a series of this

Court's cases in which we have emphasized the importance of
deferring to military judgment in matters involving the special needs of the service.
ger,

106

s.

Ct.

1310

See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinber-

(1986}

(the

"yarmulke" opinion,

which you joined}; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
(1981}

u.s.

in

57, 64-65

("in perhaps no other area has the Court accorded

Congress

greater

deference"};

Schlesinger

v.

Councilman,

supra.
This argument is largely true,

but it has two flaws.

First, O'callahan involved a judgment on how best to protect
the trial rights of servicemen.

Whether this decision was

correct as a matter of constitutional interpretation is not
~

a question that requires deference to military expertise.
Second,

Congress has not demonstrated a burning desire to
'

give the military courts more latitude.

In fact,

in 1983

'

Congress extended this Court's jurisdiction to allow consideration of appeals from the military courts.
( Supp.

II I}

§ 867

(h) ( 1} •

See 10

u.s.c.

.T his extension seems inconsistent

17.

with the notion that the military should have more freedom
to resolve its own cases.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I

am sympathetic to the military's position,

because

intuitively it seems that an attack on a serviceman's child
is sufficient to support court martial jurisdiction.

The

trial court reasonably applied the service-connected test,
however, and concluded that the impact on the Coast Guard
was

insignificant.

Although

USCMA

either

disregarded

or

reversed some of these findings, its opinion as a whole appears to expand military jurisdiction beyond the limits establ ished by this Court.

I

therefore recommend that the

decision below. be reversed.
--~~---

I

also

O' Callahan.

recommend

that

the

Court

not

overrule

There have been changes in military law

and

procedure since that case was decided, but there remain important differences between the rights afforded to defendants in civilian and military trials.

Given this, the serv-

ice-connected test is a reasonable method for balancing the
-----------.
·-·- · ·- ·
needs of the military against the rights of the accused.
---~~

The SG has not presented any compelling reason to think that
the O'Callahan creates such problems that it should be overruled.

.•
APPENDIX

Relford suggested that the following factors should be
considered in determining whether a military court has
juris diction:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within

u.s.

territorial limits.

5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to
authority stemming from the war power.
6. The absence of any military connection between the defendant's
military duty and the crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty
relating to the military.
~

8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the
case can be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property.
12. The offenses being among those traditionally prosecuted in
civilian courts.

The Court also ruled that there are 9 other considerations
that may affect the jurisdiction issue.
a) The interest of the military in the security of persons and
property on the military enclave.
b) The responsibility of the military commander for maintenance
of order in his command, and his authority to maintain that
order.
c) The adverse impact of a crime committed on a military base on
security, morale, discipline, and reputation of the base, and the
impact on the personnel and upon the military operation.

.•
d) Congress' power under Article I, §8, Cl. 14 •to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.•
e) The possibility that civilian courts will have less interest,
concern, ahd capacity to vindicate the military interest.
f) The presence of factors such as geographical and military
relationships that have important significance in favor of
service connection.
g) Historically, whether the crime against a person by one
associated with the post was subject to the General Article.
h) Whether the crime is a purely military offense that has no
counterpart in civilian criminal law.
i) The inability to draw meaningful lines between the military
post's military and non-military areas, or between a serviceman's
duty and off-duty activities.
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Opinion of the Court

I
This Court has Ion reco nized that the military is, J {
by necessity, a s ecialized society se arate from civiliall_
society. We have also recognized that the military has,
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own
during its long history. The differences between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that "it
is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise." United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). In
In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 153 (1890), the Court obnotice of appeal should be treated as a failure to file a timely notice
of appeal, and that the appeal must accordingly be dismissed. See,
e. g., Territo v. United States, 358 U. S. 279 (1959); Department of
Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 268 (1942). He also urges that the
question whether an appeal may be taken to this Court from the
Court of Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 presents a question of
first impression.
We hold that "any court of the United States," as used in § 1252,
includes the courts of appeals. The Reviser's Note for § 1252
states that the "term 'any court of the United States' includes the
courts of appeals . . . ." The definitional section of Title 28, 28
U. S. C. § 451, provides: "As used in this title: The term
'court of the United States' includes the Supreme Court of the
United States, courts of appeals, district courts . ... " Our reading
of § 1252 is further supported by that section's legislative history.
Section 1252 was originally enacted as § 2 of the Act of August 24,
1937, c. 754, 50 Stat. 751. Section 5 of that same Act defined "any
court of the United States" to include any "circuit court of appeals."
We also find no merit in appellee's contention that the asserted defects
in appellants' notice of appeal deprive this Court of jurisdiction. As
appellants note, appellee makes no claim that he did not have
actual notice of the filing of the notice of appeal . Assuming that
there was technical noncompliance with Rule 33 of this Court for
the reasons urged by appellee, that noncompliance does not deprive
this Court of jurisdiction. Cf. Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U. S.
316 n . 1 (1969); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, 418 n . 7
(1959).
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served: "An army is not a deliberative body. It is the
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the
officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier." More
recently we noted that "[t]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian," Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83,
94 ( 1953), and that "the rights of men in the armed forces
must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding
demands of discipline and duty .... " Burns v. Wilson,
346 U. S. 137, 140 ( 1953) (plurality opinion). We have
also recognized that a military officer holds a particular
position of responsibility and command in the Armed
Forces:
"The President's commission . . . recites that
'reposing special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities' of the appointee he
is named to the specified rank during the pleasure of
the President." Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, at 91.
Just as military society has been a society apart from
civilian society, so "[m]ilitary law ... is a jurisprudence
which exists separate and apart from the law which
governs in our federal judicial establishment." Burns v.
Wilson, supra, at 140. And to maintain the discipline essential to perform its mission effectively, the
military has developed what "may not unfitly be called
the customary military law" or "general usage of the military service." Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat.19, 35 (1827).
As the opinion in Martin v. M ott demonstrates, the Court
has approved the enforcement of those military customs
and usages by courts-martial from the early days of this
Nation:
" ... Courts Martial, when duly organized, are bound
to execute their duties, and regulate their modes
of proceeding, in the absence of positive enactments.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1581

RICHARD SOLORIO, PETITIONER v.
UNITED~TES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
MILITARY APPEALS
[April - , 1987]

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whe~iction of
a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (U. C. M. J.) to try a member of the armed
forces d~ds on the "service connection" of the offense
charged. We ho~ that it does not, and overrule our earlier
decision in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969).
While petitioner Richard Solorio was on active duty in the
Seventeenth Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska, he sexually abused two young daughters of fellow Coast Guardsmen. Petitioner engaged in this abuse over a two-year
period until he was transferred by the Coast Guard to Governors Island, New York. Coast Guard authorities learned of
the Alaska crimes only after petitioner's transfer, and investigation revealed that he had later committed similar sexual
abuse offenses while stationed in New York. The Governors
Island commander convened a general court-martial to try
petitioner for crimes alleged to have occurred in Alaska and
New York.
There is no "base" or "post" where Coast Guard personnel
live and work in Juneau. Consequently, nearly all Coast
Guard military personnel reside in the civilian community.
Petitioner's Alaska offenses were committed in his privately
owned home, and the fathers of the ten-to-twelve-year-old
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victims in Alaska were active duty members of the Coast
Guard assigned to the same command as petitioner. Petitioner's New York offenses also involved daughters of fellow
Coast Guardsmen, but were committed in government quarters on the Governors Island base.
After the general court-martial was convened in New
York, petitioner moved to dismiss the charges for crimes
committed in Alaska on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction under this Court's decisions in O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969), and Relford v. Commandant,
401 U. S. 355 (1971). 1 Ruling that the Alaska offenses were
not sufficiently "service connected" to be tried in the military
criminal justice system, the court-martial judge granted the
motion to dismiss. The Government appealed the dismissal
of the charges to the United States Coast Guard Court of
rial jud e's order and
Military ~view, which reversed t
reinstatedthe charges. United States v. o orw,
. J. 512
(1985). ~

The United States Court of Military Appeal~ the
Court of M~cl~ offenses were
connec e within the meaning of
O'Callahan an
e ord.
mtea States v. Solorio, 21M. J.
251 (1986). Stating that "not every off-base offense against
a servicemember's dependent is service-connected," the
court reasoned that "sex offenses against young children . . .
have a continuing effect on the victims and their families and
ultimately on the morale of any military unit or organization
to which the family member is assigned." I d., at 256. In
reaching its holding, the court also weighed a number of
1
Petitioner was charged with fourteen specifications alleging indecent
liberties, lascivious acts, and indecent assault in violation of Article 134,
U. C. M. J ., 10 U. S. C. § 934, six specifications alleging assault in violation of U. C. M. J. Art. 128, 10 U. S. C. § 928, and one specification alleging attempted rape in violation of U. C. M. J. Art. 80, 10 U. S. C. § 880.
The specifications alleged to have occurred in Alaska included all of the
Article 128 and Article 80 specifications and seven of the Article 134
specifications.
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other factors, including: the interest of Alaska civilian officials in prosecuting petitioner; the hardship on the victims,
who had moved from Alaska, that would result if they were
called to testify both at a civilian trial in Alaska and at the
military proceeding in New York; and the benefits to petitioner and the Coast Guard from trying the Alaska and New
York offenses together. 2 This court subsequently granted
certiorari, 28 U. S. C. § 1259(3), to review the decision of the
Court of Military Appeals. We now affirm.
The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces." U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Exercising
this authority, Congress has empowered courts-martial to
try servicemen for the crimes proscribed by the U. C. M. J.
Art. 2, U. C. M. J., 10 U. S.C. §§802, 817. The Alaska offenses with which petitioner was charged are each described
in the U. C. M. J. Seen. 1, supra. Thus it is not disputed
that the court-martial convened in New York possessed the
statutory authority to try petitioner on the Alaska child
abuse specifications.
In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, this
Court interpreted the Constitution as conditioning the proper
exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one
factor: the military status of the accused. Gosa v. Mayden,
413 U. S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opinion); see Kinsella v.
Singleton, 361 U. S. 234, 240-241, 243 (1960); Reid v. Covert,
354 U. S. 1, 22-23 (1957) (plurality opinion); Grafton v.
United States, 206 U. S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre,
158 U. S. 109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167,
Following the decision of the Court of Military Appeals, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a stay from that Court and from Chief Justice Burger.
The court-martial reconvened and petitioner was convicted of eight of the
fourteen specifications alleging offenses committed in Alaska and four of
the seven specifications alleging offenses committed in New York. These
convictions are currently under review by the conv~ning authority pursuant to U. C. M. J., Art. 60, 10 U.S. C. §860.
2
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183-185 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 7 Otto 509, 513-514
(1879); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123 (1866); cf. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 15 (1955); Kahn v. Anderson, 255
U. S. 1, 6-9 (1921); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 20-21
(1921). This view was premised on what the Court described as the "natural meaning" of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well
as the Fifth Amendment's exception for "cases arising in the
land or naval forces." Reid v. Covert, supra, at 19; Toth v.
Quarles, supra, at 15. As explained in Kinsella v. Singleton, supra:
"The test for jurisdiction ... is one of status, namely,
whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a
person who can be regarded as falling within the term
'land and naval Forces.' . . . Without contradiction, the
materials . . . show that military jurisdiction has always
been based on the 'status' of the accused, rather than on
the nature of the offense. To say that military jurisdiction 'defies definition in terms of military "status'" is to
defy the unambiguous language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as
well as the historical background thereof and the precedents with reference thereto." 361 U. S., at 240-241,
243 (emphasis in original).
Implicit in the military status test was the principle that
determinations concerning the scope of court-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemen was a matter
reserved for Congress:
"[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce
be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of
discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not agencies
which must determine the precise balance to be struck in
this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that
task to Congress." Burns v. Wilson, 346 137, 140
(1953) (plurality opinion).
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See also Coleman v. Tennessee, supra, at 514 (1878); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y. U. L. Rev.
181, 187 (1962). 3
In 1969, the Court i O'Callaha--:;).,, Parker departed from
the military status te an ~~ced the "new constitutiona~t a military tribunal may not try a serviceman charged with a crime that has no service connection.
See Gosa v. Mayden, supra, at 673. Applying this principle,
the O'Callahan Court held that a serviceman's off-base sexual assault on a civilian with no connection with the military \
could not be tried by court-martial. On reexamination of
O'Callahan, we have decided that the service connection test
announced in that decision should be abandoned.
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate
the armed forces, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, appears in the same section as do the provisions granting Congress authority, inter
alia, to regulate commerce among the several states, to coin
. money, and to declare war. On its face there is no indication
that the grant of power in clause 14 was any less plenary than
the grants of other authority to Congress in the same section.
Whatever doubts there might be about the extent of Congress' power under clause 14 to make rules for the "Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," that
power surely embraces the authority to regulate the conduct
of persons who are actually members of the armed services.
As noted by Justice Harlan in his O'Callahan dissent, there
is no evidence m tne a ebafes over the adoption of the Con3

One pre-1969 decision of this Court suggests that the constitutional
power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial must be limited to
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Toth v. Quarles,
350 U. S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis deleted). Broadly read, this dictum applies to determinations concerning Congress' authority over the courtsmartial of servicemen for crimes committed while they were servicemen.
Yet the Court in Toth v. Quarles was addressing only the question whether
an ex-serviceman may be tried by court-martial for crimes committed
while serving in the Air Force. Thus, the dictum may be also interpreted
as limited to that context.
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stitution that the Framers intended the language of clause 14
to be accorded anything other than its plain meaning. 4 Alexander Hamilton described these powers of Congress "essential to the common defense" as follows:
"These powers ought to exist without limitation because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent or
variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary
to satisfy them.
Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary for this
purpose [common safety]? The government of the
Union must be empowered to pass all laws and to make
regulations which have relation to them." The Federalist No. 23.
The O'Callahan Court's historical foundation for its holding rests on the view that "[b]oth in England prior to the
American Revolution and in our own national history military
trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses has been viewed
with suspicion." 395 U. S., at 268. According to the Court,
the historical evidence demonstrates that, during the late
17th and 18th centuries in England as well as the early years
of this country, courts-martial did not have authority to try
soldiers for civilian offenses. The Court began with a review
of the 17th century struggle in England between Parliament
and the Crown over control of the scope of court-martial jurisdiction. As stated by the Court, this conflict was resolved
when William and Mary accepted the Bill of Rights in 1689,
which granted Parliament exclusive authority to define the
jurisdiction of military tribunals. See 395 U. S., at 268.
The Court correctly observed that Parliament, wary of
' See O'C allahan, 395 U. S., at 277 (Harlan, J ., dissenting); 2
M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 329-330
(1911); 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in
the Convention Held in Philadelphia in 1787, 443, 545 (1876).
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abuses of military power, exercised its new authority
sparingly. 5 Indeed, a statute enacted by Parliament in 1689
provided for court-martial only for the crimes of sedition, mutiny, and desertion, and exempted members of militia from
its scope. Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 W & M, Sess. 2, c. 4.
The O'Callahan Court's representation of English history
, owever, IS ess an accufollowing the Mih ary ct o
r.ate. In particular, the Court posited that "[i]t was . . . the
rule in Britain at the time of the American Revolution that a
soldier could not be tried for a civilian offense committed in
Britain; instead military officers were required to use their
energies and office to insure that the accused soldier would
be tried before a civil court." 395 U. S., at 269. In making
this statement, the Court was apparently referring to Section
XI, Article I of the British Articles of War in effect at the
time of the Revolution. 6 This Article provided:
"Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a
Capital Crime, or of having used Violence, or committed
any offence [sic] against the Persons or Property of Our
Subjects, ... the Commanding Officer and Officers of
every Regiment, Troop, or Party to which the ... accused shall belong are hereby required upon application
duly made by or in behalf of the Party or Parties injured,
to use . . . utmost Endeavors to deliver over the accused
5
See, e. g., 1 W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 8-9 (2d ed. /
1896) (hereinafter Winthrop); G. Nelson & J. Westbrook, Court-Martial
Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of
O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 7-11 (1969) (hereinafter Nelson
& Westbrook).
6
There is some confusion among historians and legal scholars about
which version of the British Articles of War were "in effect" at the time
of the American Revolution. Some cite to the Articles of War of 1765
and others to the Articles of War of 1774. Compare, e. g., 2 Winthrop
1448, with J.:.- H~~Court-Martial Jurisdiction 34 (1986) (hereinafter
Horbaly). Forpreseiif purposes, however, the two versions of the Articles contain only stylistic differences. In the interest of simplicity, we will
refer to the 1774 Articles.
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. . . to the Civil Magistrate." British Articles of War of
1774, reprinted in G. Davis, A Treatise on the Military
Law of the United States 581, 589 (3d ed. 1915) (hereinafter Davis).
This provision, however, is not the sole statement in the
Articles bearing on court-martial jurisdiction over civilian
offenses. Specifically, Section XIV, Article XVI provided
that all officers and soldiers who
"shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging to any of our Subjects, unless by order of the
then Commander in Chief of Our Forces, to annoy
Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us, that he or
they shall be found guilty of offending herein shall (besides such Penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished according to the Nature and Degree of the Offence
[sic], by the Judgment of a Regimental or General Court
Martial." Davis 593.
Under this provision, military tribunals had jurisdiction over
offenses punishable under civil law. Nelson & Westbrook
11. Accordingly, the O'Callahan Court erred in suggesting
that, at the time of the American Revolution, military tribunals in England "were available only where ordinary civil
courts were not." 395 U. S., at 269, and n. 11.
The history of early American practice furnishes even less
support to O'Callahan's historical thesis. The American Articles of War of 1776, which were based on the British Articles, contained a provision similar to Section XI, Article I of
the British Articles, requiring commanding officers to deliver
over to civil magistrates any officer or soldier accused of "a
capital crime, ... having used violence, or ... any offense
against the persons or property of the good people of the
United States" upon application by or on behalf of an injured
party. American Articles of War of 1776, Section IX, Article I, reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1490. It has been postulated
that American courts-martial had jurisdiction over the crimes
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described in this provision where no application for a civilian
trial was made by or on behalf of the injured civilian. 7 Indeed, American military records reflect trials by court-martial during the late 18th century for offenses against civilians
and punishable under civil law, such as theft and assault.8
The authority to try soldiers for civilian crimes may be
found in the much-disputed "general article" of the 1776 Articles of War, which allowed court-martial jurisdiction over
"[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which
officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline." American Articles of War of
1776, Section XVIII, Article 5, reprinted in 2 Winthrop ~503.
Some authorities, such as those cited by the O'Callahan
Court, interpreted this language as limiting court-martial jurisdiction to crimes that had a direct impact on military discipline. 9 Several others, however, have interpreted the language as encompassing all nQncapital crimes proscribed by
the civillaw.'0 Even W. Winthrop, the authority relied on
See Nelson & Westbrook 14; cf. Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and
the Standing Army: Another Problem with Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13
Vand. L. Rev. 435, 445-446 (1960) (hereinafter Duke & Vogel).
8
See O'Callahan, 395 U. S. , at 278, n. 3 (Harlan, J ., dissenting); see
alsoJ. Bishop, Justice under Fire 81-82 (1974) (hereinafter Bishop); Nelson
& Westbrook 15; Comment, O'Callahan and Its Progeny: A Survey of
Their Impact on the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 15 Viii. L. Rev. 712,
719, n. 38 (1970) (hereinafter Comment).
9
See 2 Winthrop 1123; Duke & Vogel446-447.
10
See, e. g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 348 (1907); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Appendix to S. Rep.
No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 91 (statement of Brigadier General
Enoch Crowder).
George Washington also seems to have held this view. When informed
of the decision of a military court that a complaint by a civilian against a
member of the military should be redressed only in a civilian court, he
stated in a General Order dated February 24, 1779:
"All the improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or soldier being
destructive of good order and discipline as well as subversive of the rights
of society is as much a breach of the military, as civil law and as punishable
7

j
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most extensively by the majority in O'Callahan, recognized
that military authorities read the general article to include
crimes "committed upon or against civilians . .. at or near a
military camp or post." 2 Winthrop 1124, 1126, n. 1.
We think the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and in this country _during the 17th and 18th centuries
is far too ambiguous to justify the restriction on the plain
language of clause 14 which O'Callahan imported into it. 11
There is no doubt that the English practice during this period
shows a strong desire in that country to transfer from the
Crown to Parliament the control of the scope of court-martial
jurisdiction. And it is equally true that Parliament was
chary in granting jurisdiction to courts-martial, although not
as chary as the O'Callahan opinion suggests. But reading
clause 14 consistently with its plain language does not disserve that concern; Congress, and not the Executive, was
given the authority to make rules for the regulation of the
armed forces.
The O'Callahan Court cryptically stated that "the 17th
century conflict over the proper role of courts-martial and the
enforcement of the domestic, criminal law was not, however,
merely a dispute over what organ of government had jurisby the one as the other." 14 Writings of Washington 140-141 (George
Washington Bicentennial ed. 1936).
" The history of court-martial jurisdiction after the adoption of the Constitution also provides little support for O'Callahan. For example, in
1800, Congress enacted Articles for the Better Government of the Navy,
which provided that "[a]ll offences [sic] committed by persons belonging to
the navy while on the shore, shall be punished in the same manner as if
they had been committed at sea." Act of April23, 1800, ch. 33, art. XVII,
2 Stat. 47. Among the offenses punishable if committed at sea were murder, embezzlement, and theft. In addition, the Act also provided that "[i]f
any person in the navy shall, wheJl on shore, plunder, abuse, or maltreat
any inhabitant, or injure his property in any way, he shall suffer such punishment as the court martial shall adjudge." Art. XXVII, 2 Stat. 48.
This broad grant of jurisdiction to naval courts-martial would suggest that
limitations on the power of other military tribunals d:rring this period were
the result of legislative choice rather than want of constitutional power.

'

.
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diction. It also involved substantive disapproval of the general use of military courts for trial of ordinary crimes." 395
U. S. at, 268. But such disapproval in England at the time
of William and Mary hardly proves that the Framers of the
Constitution, contrary to the plenary language in which they
conferred the power on Congress, meant to freeze court-martial usage at a particular time in such a way that Congress
might not change it. The unqualified language of clause 14
suggests that whatever these concerns, they were met by the
vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive, authority to
make rules for the government of the military.' 2
Given the dearth of histQrical support for the O'Callahan
Ian's
holding, there 1s overw e mmg orce o ustlce
e on 1
' as
reasoning that the p am angua e
interpreted by numerous decisions of this Court preceding
12
See, e. g., O'Callahan, 395 U.S., at 277 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 1
W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitutio
4, 424-426 (1953) (hereinafter Crosskey); Comment 718; but c . Horbaly, Court Martial Jurisdiction 45-56 (1986).
The only other basis for saying that the Framers intended the words of
Art. I, § 8. cl. 14 to be narrowly construed is the suggestion that the Framers "could hardly have been unaware of Blackstone's strong condemnation
of criminal justice administered under military procedures." Duke &
Vogel 449. In his Commentaries, Blackstone wrote:
"When the nation was engaged in war ... more rigorous methods were put
in use for the raising of armies, and the due regulation and discipline of the
soldiery; which are to be looked upon only as temporary excrescences bred
out of the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the permanent and
perpetual laws of the Kingdom. For martial law, which is built on no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in it's [sic] decisions, is ... something indulged in rather than allowed as a law. The necessity of order and
discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance; and
therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the King's
courts are open to all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the
land." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *413.
Although we do not doubt that Blackstone's views on military law were
known to the Framers, see Crosskey 411-412, 424-425, we are not persuaded that their relevance is sufficiently compelling to overcome the
unqualified language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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O'Callahan, should be controlling on the subject of courtmartial jurisdiction. 395 U. S., at 275-278 Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U. S. 658, 696 (1978) ("[W]e ought not 'disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper
for [100] years'"), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370

u. s. 294, 307 (1962).

}

Decisions of this Court after O'Callahan have also emphasized that Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the
needs of the military. As we recently reiterated, "'[j]udicial
deference is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make
rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.'"
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. - - , - - (1986), quoting
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 70 (1981). Since
O'Callahan, we have adhered to this principle of deference in
a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional rights
of servicemen were implicated. See, e. g., Goldman v.
Weinberger, supra, at-- (free exercise of religion); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 300-305 (1983) (racial discrimination); Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 64-66, 70-71
(sex discrimination); Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 357, 360
(1980) (free expression); Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U. S. 25,
43 (1976) (right to counsel in summary court-martial proceedings); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 753 (1975)
(availab~ of injunctive relief from an impending courtmartial), Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974) (due process rights and freedom of expression).
The notion that civil courts are "ill-equipped" to establish ~
policies regarding matters of military concern is substanti.ated by experience under the service-connection approach.
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S., at 305. In his O'Callahan
dissent, Justice Harlan forecasted that "the infinite permuta- ~~
tions of possibly -relevant factors are bound to create confusion and proliferate litigation over the [court-martial] juris-
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diction issue." 395 U. S., at 284. In fact, within two years
after O'Callahan, this Court found it necessary to expound
on the meaning of the decision, enumerating a myriad of factors for courts to weigh in determining whether an offense is
service connected. Relford, supra. Yet the service connection approach, even as elucidated in Relford, has proved confusing and difficult for military courts to apply. 13
Since O'Callahan and Relford, military courts have identified numerous categories of offenses requiring specialized
analysis of the service connection requirement. For example, the courts have highlighted subtle distinctions among offenses committed on a military base, offenses committed offbase, offenses arising from events occurring both on and off a
base, and offenses committed on or near the boundaries of a
base. 14 Much time and energy has also been expended in litigation over other jurisdictional factors, such as the status of
the victim of the crime, and the results are difficult to reconcile. 15 The confusion created by the complexity of the service
See Cooper, O'Callahan Revisited: Severing the Service Connection,
76 Mil. L. Rev. 165, 186-187 (1977) (hereinafter Cooper); Tomes, The
Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to Off-Post Jurisdiction Now, Fifteen Years After O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 A. F . L. Rev. 1,
9-35 (1985) (hereinafter Tomes); cf. United States v. Alef, 3M. J . 414, 416,
n. 4. (C. M. A. 1977); United States v. McCarthy, 2 M. J . 26, 29, n. 1
(C. M. A. 1976).
14
See, e. g., United States v. Garries, 19 M. J. 845 (A. F. C. M. R.
1985) (serviceman's on-post murder of wife held service connected), aff'd ,
22M. J. 288 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U. S. (1986); United States v.
Williamson, 19M. J. 617 (A. C. M. R. 1984) (serviceman's off-post sexual
offense involving young girl held service connected); United States v.
Mauck, 17M. J. 1033 (A. C. M. R.) (variety of offenses committed fifteen
feet from arsenal boundary held service connected), petition for review denied, 19 M. J. 106 (C. M. A. 1984); United States v. Scott, 15 M. J. 589
(A. C. M. R. 1983) (serviceman's off-post murder of another serviceman
held service connected where crime had its basis in on-post conduct of
participants).
16
Compare United States v. Wilson, 2M. J. 24 (C. M. A. 1976) (off-post
robbery and assault of a fellow servicemen held not service connected), and
United States v. Tucker, 1M. J. 463 (C. M. A. 1976) (off-post concealment
18
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connection requirement, however, is perhaps best illustrated
in the area of off-base drug offenses. 16 Soon after
O'Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals held that drug offenses were of such "special military importance" that their
trial by court-martial was unaffected by the deCision. United
States v. Beeker, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 563, 565, 40 C. M. R.
275, 277 (1969). Nevertheless, the court has changed its position on the issue no less than two times since Beeker, each
time basing its decision on O'Callahan and Relford. 17
of property stolen from fellow serviceman on-post held not to be service
connected), with United States v. Lockwood, 15 M. J. 1 (C. M. A. 1983)
(on-post larceny of fellow serviceman's wallet and use of identification
cards in it to obtain loan from an off-post business establishment held service connected), and United States v. Shorte, 18M. J. 518 (A. F. C. M. R.
1984) (off-post felonious assault committed against fellow serviceman held
not service connected).
16
See Cooper 172-182; Tomes 13-31.
17
Seven years after United States v. Beeker, the Court of Military
Appeals expressly renounced that decision, holding that O'Callahan and
Relford mandated the conclusion that off-base drug offenses by a serviceman could not be tried by court-martial. See United States v. McCarthy,
2 M. J. 26, 29 (C. M. A. 1976); United States v. Williams, 2 M. J. 81, 82
(C. M. A. 1976); see also United States v. Conn, 6 M. J. 351, 353 (C. M. A.
1979); United States v. Alef, 3 M. J . 414, 415-418 (C. M. A. 1977). Reversing its position again in 1980, the Court of Military Appeals decided
that such a restrictive approach was not required under this Court's decisions. United States v. Trottier, 9 M. J. 337, 340-351 (1980). The court
therefore held that "the gravity and immediacy of the threat to military
personnel and installations posed by drug traffic and ... abuse convince us
that very few drug involvements of a service person will not be 'service
connected.'" I d., at 351.
United States v. Trottier, however, has not settled the confusion in this
area. In Trottier, the court identified the following exception to its general rule: "[I]t would not appear that use of marijuana by a serviceperson
on a lengthy period of leave away from the military community would have
such an effect on the military as to warrant the invocation of a claim of special military interest and significance adequate to support court-martial jurisdiction under O'Callahan." ld., at 350, n. 28. Since Trottier, at least
two lower military court decisions have found court-martial jurisdiction
over offenses arguably falling within this exception. See United States v.
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When considered together with the doubtful foundations of
O'Callahan, the confusion wrought by the decision leads us
to conclude that we should read clause 14 in accord with the
plain meaning of its language as we did in the many years before.O'Callahan was decided. That case's novel approach to
court-martial jurisdiction must bow "to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning." Burnet v. Coronado, 285 U. S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We therefore hold that the requirements of the
Constitution are not violated where, as here, a court-martial
is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the
armed services at the time of the offense charged. 18

Affirmed.
Lange, 11 M. J. 884 (A. F. C. M. R. 1981), petition for review denied, 12
M. J. 318 (C. M. A. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during six-day leave
held sufficient to establish service connection); United States v. Brace, 11
M. J. 794 (A. F. C. M. R.), petition for review denied, 12 M. J. 109
(C. M. A. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during six-day leave 275 miles
from post held sufficient to establish service connection); see also Horbaly
534-535.
18
Petitioner argues that the Court of Military Appeals' decision should be
reversed because it applies a more expansive subject-matter jurisdiction
test to him than had previously been announced. According to petitioner,
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over him violates his rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Our review of the
record in this case, however, reveals that petitioner did not raise his due
process claim in the Court of Military Appeals. The Court of Military Review, which reinstated the Alaska charges against petitioner, held that
military courts had jurisdiction over petitioner's Alaska offenses. Petitioner therefore had an opportunity to raise his due process challenge in
the proceedings before the Court of Military Appeals. He has not offered
any explanation for his failure to do so. In fact, petitioner, in his reply
brief and at oral argument, did not contest the Government's suggestion
that he inexcusably failed to raise his due process claim earlier in the proceedings. See Reply Brief of Petitioner 16-19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-39.
We therefore decline to consider the claim. See, e. g., Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 443 (1984); Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U. S.
346, 362 (1981); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 788, n. 7 (1977).
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